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ABSTRACT
We present an effective technique for training deep learning agents
capable of negotiating on a set of clauses in a contract agreement
using a simple communication protocol. We use Multi Agent Re-
inforcement Learning to train both agents simultaneously as they
negotiate with each other in the training environment. We also
model selfish and prosocial behavior to varying degrees in these
agents. Empirical evidence is provided showing consistency in
agent behaviors. We further train a meta agent with a mixture of
behaviors by learning an ensemble of different models using rein-
forcement learning. Finally, to ascertain the deployability of the
negotiating agents, we conducted experiments pitting the trained
agents against human players. Results demonstrate that the agents
are able to hold their own against human players, often emerging
as winners in the negotiation. Our experiments demonstrate that
the meta agent is able to reasonably emulate human behavior.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Reaching a consensus on the contents of a contract agreement is
often an expensive and time consuming task for the negotiating
parties involved. Automating this process is important not just from
an industrial point of view but also for all related problems where
negotiation is required. The primary challenge in this endeavor is
to suitably model the behavior of an AI agent. Several papers in the
literature [4, 14] have addressed the problem of modeling agents for
contract negotiation. However, most of the proposed approaches
use a combination of mathematical models and rules. With the
upsurge of deep reinforcement learning, in the past few years, it
becomes interesting to analyze the behavior learnt by deep agents
trained to negotiate via reinforcement learning. Recently, we have
seen valuable contributions in the domain of AI agents’ negotiation
using deep reinforcement learning [3, 17] but much work needs to
be done for their direct applicability to various negotiation oriented
domains such as contract negotiation.
Although there is training data available for a negotiation domain
in which agents learn to divide items between themselves [17]
(this is the problem of resource reallocation which has been the
formalism in most negotiation studies), no such data is available for
contract negotiation where agents need to reach a consensus about
which items to share between them (clauses). This makes it difficult
to train an agent which can converse in natural language. Although
crowdsourcing can be utilized for generating data but it is resource
intensive. Nevertheless, we present an approach where we train
agents to converse with each other using a simple protocol which
is an interpretable sequence of bits. This protocol is scalable and
robust. The training is done using reinforcement learning. We first
model an agent as a neural network and then train two such agents
concurrently where they play several rounds of negotiation games
against each other and learn to coordinate with each other based
on the outcome (reward). The behavior of the agents is modeled by
using the effective technique of varying the reward signal. In this
way, we get agents with different behaviors. We show that agents
trained in this manner indeed learn to coordinate their moves and
produce context relevant outputs. We observe that agents have
consistency in their behaviors and this is shown by making all
agents negotiate against each other and analyzing the results.
For emulating human behavior, we train an agent (meta agent)
with a dynamic behavior. We use a model which is an ensemble
of the 4 agents mentioned above, with a "selector" agent on top
which selects the appropriate behavior based on the negotiation
state. This agent is also trained using reinforcement learning. We
have found evidence that the meta agent learns a simple decision
tree while selecting it’s behavior.
Finally, for assessing the usability of the negotiation agents in
real world scenarios, we conduct experiments where we evalu-
ate the agents against human players. We show that agents show
consistency in behaviors even against human players. Thus, we
show that our agents are deployable in real industrial scenarios for
negotiating on a contract.
Hence, the main contributions of this paper are:
(1) A deep learning model and a reinforcement learning proce-
dure for training an AI agent to negotiate in the domain of
contract negotiation.
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(2) Modeling selfish/prosocial behavior by varying the reward
signal for the agent and its opponent in the reinforcement
learning framework and empirical evidence for the same.
(3) An AI agent with a dynamic behavior (varying within a
negotiation instance) by learning an ensemble of different
agent behaviors using reinforcement learning.
(4) Evidence for the usability and success of the negotiation
agent against human players through real life experimental
results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 formulates
the problem statement and provides a general framework for our
negotiation environment. It also describes the model for the nego-
tiation agent and the evaluation metrics. Section 4 describes the
model architecture and learning procedure. Section 5 analyzes the
results when the agents which are trained against each other nego-
tiate. Section 6 provides an analysis of the behavior of the agents
and demonstrates consistency in the learnt behaviors. Section 7
provides details about the model and performance of themeta agent
which has a mixed/dynamic behavior. Section 8 gives the results of
the human evaluation. Finally, we conclude and give directions for
future work in Section 9.
2 RELATEDWORK
Contract negotiation can be seen formally as a resource realloca-
tion problem [6, 7]. Several papers have addressed the problem
of building AI agents that can negotiate on a contract. But most
have focused on domain specific applications of the same [2, 26].
However, our approach to this is one where we require agents to
reason about a shared set of decision variables (clauses) [9]. The
problem formulation is similar to the furniture layout task [8, 25],
where two conversants try to agree on five pieces of furniture to
place in a room.
In general, much work on building negotiation agents has fo-
cused on mathematically modeling these agents or building fine
grained rules [2, 4, 23, 27]. However, machine learning has seldom
been used for tackling this problem. One of initial works on the
use of Reinforcement Learning in negotiation focused on formally
defining a reinforcement learning state for the task [13].
Policy Hill Climbing (PHC) has been shown to converge better
than traditional algorithms such as Q-Learning [11] for multi agent
training, but convergence becomes an issue with an increase in size
of the action space. This is where modern Deep Learning methods
become useful.
With recent advancements in deep learning, there has been a lot
of interest in building agents that learn to communicate and coor-
dinate for various multi agent tasks. Deep reinforcement learning
methods can be used to train agents to cooperate in complex en-
vironments [16]. Furthermore, it is possible to build deep learning
agents that can be trained to develop their own protocols to solve
collaborative tasks [3, 10].
More recently, we see valuable contributions in building deep
agents for negotiation domain. With the availability of data, deep
learning agents can be trained to imitate humans (converse in
natural language) and subsequently even outperform them by using
reinforcement learning techniques [17]. Although robust and end
to end, such models require training data, collecting which can be
resource intensive for different domains.
Modeling negotiation behavior by varying the reward signal has
been used previously in Ref. [3], but their main aim is to study
the communication protocols that can emerge during negotiation.
They limit themselves to two behaviors whereas we explore four
behaviors in addition to a dynamic behavior agent.
With the exception of Ref. [17], none of the previous works, to
the best of our knowledge provide qualitative/quantitative results
against human players.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, we formulate the problem of negotiating on a set of clauses
in a contract agreement scenario wherein two parties have to reach
a consensus as to which clauses need to be included in / excluded
from the final draft. For this paper, we have considered 6 clauses
but our method is generalizable for any number of clauses (We
have considered 6 clauses because we found that this reduces the
training time of our model while preserving enough complexity in
the problem).
3.1 Negotiation Environment
The value that an agent attaches to the clauses is represented by
a utility function which is a vector of 6 integers between -12 and
12 (excluding 0) such that their sum is zero. There is an additional
constraint that there is at least one positive and one negative value
in this vector and that the sum of positives is +12 and that of the
negatives is −12. More formally, this vector is represented as:
U = Shuffle(P
⊕
N ) (1)
P = [p1,p2, ...,pk ] (2)
N = [n1,n2, ...,n6−k ] (3)
where, 0 < k < 6,⊕ is the concatenation operator and Shuffle(.)
is a "random shuffling" function. Also, pi ∈ {1, ..., 12} and ni ∈
{−12, ...,−1}, along with the following constraints:∑
i
pi = 12 (4)∑
i
ni = −12 (5)
Each element in the list represents the "importance" that the
agent attaches to the corresponding clause. We have this distribu-
tion so that in every case there is a mixture of the most benefi-
cial clauses (values summing to 12) and the most harmful clauses
(values summing to −12). For example, if an agent has a utility
[9,−5, 2,−1,−6, 1], clause one is non negotiable as it has the high-
est value. On the other hand, clauses three, four and six might be
negotiable as they do not have a high absolute value (Of course,
the decision as to whether a clause is negotiable or not has to be
made the the agent). Notice that the maximum points an agent can
score is 12 and the minimum is −12. We exclude the "zero-valued"
(neutral) clause to avoid skewness of values in the utility function.
Each of the agents receive this utility which is sampled uni-
formly. The agents then communicate with each other by giving
offers, which is a sequence of 6 bits, St ∈ {0, 1}6. Here, subscript t
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Figure 1: A negotiation example.
refers to the time-step at which the offer was produced. Each bit in
this sequence is the agent’s decision on the corresponding clause (0
meaning exclude and 1 meaning include). The communication fol-
lows a sequential structure and the agent that goes first is decided
by an unbiased coin flip. This communication goes on between
agents until one of the following happens:
(1) An agreement is reached. This happens when an agent gives
the same offer that it receives.
(2) The time runs out. We keep a limit of 30 offers (15 for each
agent) after which the negotiation process stops with a dis-
agreement1.
At the end of the negotiation, each of the negotiating parties
get a reward based on the agreed sequence of bits. So, if agents
A and B have utilities UA and U B respectively, and the agreed
sequence is S , A gets S .UA and B gets S .U B , where . represents
the dot product. An example negotiation between two agents is
illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2 Negotiation Agent
Given a utility function and the opponent’s offer, we divide the
problem of producing an offer into two parts:
(1) Deep Neural Network (DNN) Component: The first part is to
decide the number of bits to be flipped in the opponent’s
offer. This part is taken care of by the deep neural network
which is trained through Reinforcement Learning.
(2) Rule Based Component: Once the neural network decides
the number of bits to be flipped, the part of deciding which
exact bits to flip is deterministic i.e. flip the bits that result
in maximum increase in score.
For example, if the utility is [2,−6,−2,−4, 7, 3], the oppo-
nent’s offer is [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1] and the number of bits to be
flipped is 3 (decided by the neural network), we would flip
the second, third and fifth bit (rule based) as that would in-
crease the score by 6 + 2 + 7 = 15 points and we would get
12 points (which is the maximum one can get).
This approach has two distinct advantages:
1We have run our experiments for different number of clauses and thresholds and
have found that the agents require a certain minimum number of turns during training
so that they learn to reach an optimal solution. For 6 clauses this turns out to be 30. A
more thorough analysis of the relation between number of clauses and the threshold
may form an interesting subject for future work.
(1) The action space for reinforcement learning reduces signifi-
cantly. This is particularly advantageous when the number
of clauses are much higher than 6. In general, for n clauses,
the action space goes from 2n to n and hence simplifies the
training procedure.
(2) The rule based component provides us leverage over the
agent making it suitable for deployment against humans
(see Section 8). Without the rule based component, the deep
network might learn policies which are suitable for negotia-
tion with AI agents but not against humans [3, 17].
We call this negotiation agent the RL Agent.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation of a negotiation is done based on the following
metrics:
Dialog Length. The dialog length is the average number of time
steps for which the negotiation lasts.
Agreement Rate. Percentage of negotiations that end in an agree-
ment represent the agreement rate.
Optimality rate. The optimality rate is the percentage of negotia-
tions that end in an optimal deal. We say that a deal is optimal if it
is both Pareto Optimal [22] and the both agents receive a positive
score. A solution is Pareto optimal if neither agent’s score can be
improved without lowering the other’s score.
Average score. The average number of points earned by an agent.
To see the maximum joint reward the agents can earn on an average
on optimal deals, we greedily search through all possible deals
(26 = 64) for all of the samples in the test set and select the one
which results in the maximum joint reward and optimal deals. The
average of maximum joint reward for the test set is 1.40 (0.70 for
each agent 2. This is used for comparison of average scores of
trained agents in Table 2 and Table 3).
4 LEARNING PROCEDURE
We define below, the architecture and training procedure for the
DNN component of the negotiation agent.
4.1 Model Architecture and learning
At a given time step t in the negotiation process, an agentA receives
the following as the state input:
(1) It’s Utility function UA.
(2) Offer given by opponent B, SBt .
(3) It’s previous offer, SAt−1.
(4) Agent ID, I ∈ {0, 1}.
We convert this input into a dense representation DAt as
DAt = [OfferMLP([UA, SBt ]),OfferMLP([UA, SAt−1]),
AgentLookup(I ),TurnLookup(t )]. (6)
Here OfferMLP(.) is a 2-layer MLP with ReLU activation [19],
AgentLookup(.) is an embeddingwhich gives a dense representation
for the agent identity and TurnLookup(.) is another embedding
which encodes information in the timestep.
2We normalize the points earned by the maximum points possible i.e. 12.0
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Table 1: Behavior induced in agents A and B depending on
whether there is an optimality signal in the rewards. The
agents in the first two rows are subject to the same signal.
Hence, they have similar tags in the brackets.
Behavior Signal
A B A B
Prosocial (Agent 1) Prosocial (Agent 1) Yes Yes
Selfish (Agent 2) Selfish (Agent 2) No No
Prosocial (Agent 3) Selfish (Agent 4) Yes No
The representation DAt is passed to a 2-layer GRU [5] as
hAt = GRU(DAt ,hAt−1), (7)
where hAt−1 is the hidden state generated by A at its previous turn.
The number of bits to be flipped are predicted (action taken) by
sampling from policy πA:
πA = Softmax(WhAt ). (8)
During test time though, we do not sample and select the action
with the highest probability.
At the next time step, the agent B also outputs a similar policy
πB . Each agent i ∈ {A,B} tries to maximize the following objective
individually:
Li = E
xt∼(πA,πB )
[∑
t
γ (T−t )(ri (x1...T ) − bi )
]
+ λH [πi ]. (9)
Here,
(1) xt is the action taken by an agent at time t ,
(2) γ is the discount factor,
(3) T is the total time steps for which the negotiation lasts,
(4) ri (x1...T ) is the reward received by agent i at the end of the
negotiation which is a function of the sequence of actions
xt taken by the agent from t = 1 to t = T ,
(5) bi is the baseline which is used to reduce variance, and
(6) H [πi ] is the entropy regularization term to ensure explo-
ration and λ controls this degree of exploration [18].
The gradient of Li is estimated and the parameters updated as in
REINFORCE [24].
The parameters of agents A and B are shared. These parameters
are updated after each episode. An episode refers to a negotiation
game between agents A and B. We run the training for 5 epochs
with 105 episodes in each epoch. The values of all hyperparameters
is given in Appendix B.
4.2 Behavior Modeling (Reward)
The manner in which rewards are given to the RL agent decides
its behavior. In particular, we enforce selfish and prosocial behavior
in the RL agent in the following way (although there may be a
plethora of complex behaviors, we limit ourselves to the simplest
ones):
(1) To enforce prosocial behavior, the agent is given the reward
(the number of points earned at the end of the negotiation)
iff the deal is optimal. If the deal is not optimal, the agent
is given a reward of -0.5. This ensures that the agent not
Figure 2: Learning Curves.
only cares about its own gain/loss while learning its policy
but also takes into account the opponent’s priorities as well.
In other words, the reward here has a signal for the overall
optimality.
(2) If there is no optimality signal in the reward, i.e. the agent
receives as a reward, whatever it earned in the negotiation,
then a selfish behavior is induced. The agent then, learns to
maximize its own score.
Both agents receive a reward of -0.5 if the negotiation ends in a
disagreement.
As two agents learn concurrently, we get agents with 4 different
behaviors depending on how the opponent is trained to behave
(Table 1).
(1) Prosocial agent trained against a Prosocial agent (PP): We
get the behavior PP when both agents are trained to have a
prosocial behavior.
(2) Selfish agent trained against a Selfish agent (SS): If both agents
are trained to be selfish we get the agent SS.
(3) Selfish agent trained against a Prosocial agent and vice-versa
(SP,PS): When one agent is trained to be selfish and its oppo-
nent is trained to be prosocial, we get two agents whom we
call SP and PS respectively.
5 COORDINATION BETWEEN TRAINED
AGENTS
Here we analyze the results of the negotiation between agents who
have been trained against each other. To assesswhether these agents
are learning to coordinate in a way so as to improve their scores
while maintaining their enforced behavior, we make the agents
play a set of 2000 negotiation games which are held out, after every
25000 episodes of training. Figure 2 shows this performance. From
these curves, we observe the following:
(1) When both agents are trained to be Prosocial, they gradually
converge to the same score. This is not surprising as both
agents are being trained to reach a middle ground.
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the sequence of actions taken by the agents for all three cases. This only shows the top
20 occurrences. The orange part represents the number of optimal deals when the agents decide to use the corresponding
sequence. Each point on the x axis represents the sequence of number of bits flipped by the agents one after the other. The
number on the top of each bar is the percentage optimality using the given sequence throughout.
(2) When both agents are trained to be Selfish, one of the agents
ends up scoring more than the other. This, we observe is
because it is impossible to reach an agreement (which is
the ultimate goal) if both agents are stubborn hence it is
necessary for at least one agent to compromise.
(3) When one agent is trained to be Selfish and the other to
be Prosocial, the Selfish one clearly outscores the Prosocial
one because the selfish agent and will seldom concede. The
prosocial agent on the other hand, concedes more easily.
To test whether the RL agent learns something non-trivial, we
compare its performance with two simple baselines:
(1) RANDOM At every step, the agent chooses random number
of bits to be flipped.
(2) COMMON Agent 1 (agent who goes first) gives its most
selfish offer followed by Agent 2 who does the same. At the
third step, Agent 1 offers the intersection of the first two
offers (common benefit) to which Agent 2 agrees. If there is
no intersection, it is a disagreement.
The results in Table 2 are an average over a separate test set of 30000
negotiations. It is clear from the results listed out in table that all
three variants of behavioral combinations do better than the base-
lines in terms of Optimality and Joint Reward. This shows that the
agents which are trained against each other learn to coordinate their
moves such that apart from maintaining their enforced behavior,
they try to maximize their scores as well as the optimality. Observe
that joint reward is maximum when both agents are prosocial as
both agents are not only concerned with maximizing their own
reward but also of their opponent’s so as to reach optimal deals.
This corroborates the results reported in Ref. [3].
Table 2: Coordination between trained agents. In optimality
column, the numbers in bracket are the percentages on the
agreed deals.
Agent
A
Agent
B
Dialog
Length
Agreement
Rate (%)
Optimality
Rate (%)
Average
Score
A(0.70) B(0.70)
RANDOM 15.90 100 24.55 0.25 0.25
COMMON 3.77 79.54 70.39 (88.49) 0.50 0.50
PP PP 16.98 96.24 82.33 (85.55) 0.65 0.66
SS SS 17.47 88.31 74.88 (84.79) 0.54 0.69
SP PS 13.87 91.90 86.74 (94.38) 0.73 0.55
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of the sequence of
actions (an action is the number of bits flipped by an agent in
the opponent’s offer) taken by the RL agents during the course of
negotiations during test time. In each bar, the orange part represents
the number of optimal deals. The distributions show that there is
a joint preference among agents for certain sequences more than
others which is evident by their skewed nature. This nature of
the distributions also raises the question: Do the agents learn to
identify a context from their utilities and act according to that or do
they learn to give generic outputs irrespective of their utilities? To
answer this question, we made the agents negotiate on the test set
using only the 20 most frequent sequences. The number on the top
of each bar is the percentage optimality using the given sequence
throughout the test set. We observe that none of the numbers are
greater than the overall optimality reported in Table 2. This shows
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Table 3: Interplay between Agents. In optimality column,
the numbers in bracket are the percentages on the agreed
deals. As we get two SSs and PPs after training, we choose
the ones which outscore it’s opponent during training and
use them in the interplay negotiations.
Agent
A
Agent
B
Dialog
Length
Agreement
Rate (%)
Optimality
Rate (%)
Average
Score
A(0.70) B(0.70)
SP SS 26.50 59.00 55.81 (94.59) 0.42 0.48
PP PS 9.85 97.96 62.55 (63.85) 0.51 0.68
PP SS 23.98 90.01 69.80 (77.54) 0.44 0.75
SP PP 24.64 90.43 64.28 (71.08) 0.71 0.45
SS PS 11.89 93.03 69.43 (74.63) 0.70 0.50
that the agents indeed capture the context from their utilities and
behave accordingly.
It is interesting to note that the optimality is the highest when
both agents are trained to have different behaviors. This, we ob-
serve, is because the Prosocial agents make some offers which have
negative valued clauses. If both agents are Prosocial, there might
be cases where the agents agree on an offer with negative valued
clauses for both agents which leads to non optimal solutions. On the
other hand, if one of the agents is selfish, these cases will be avoided
because the selfish agent won’t agree to them. This is illustrated in
the Appendix A.
6 INTERPLAY BETWEEN AGENTS
In the previous section, we analyzed the results when an agent
negotiates with the agent against which it is trained. But to analyze
the performance of an agent against a policy it has never seen,
we run the test negotiations between agents who have never seen
each other during training. These negotiations are what we refer
to as Interplay Negotiations. Table 3 shows the results of these
negotiations. These results are an average over the test set of 30000
negotiations.
It is clear from the results that the optimalities of the interplay
between agents are not very high which is because these agents
have never seen each other during training and thus have not been
able to develop their policies accordingly.
Moreover, note that the agreement rate is highest (97.96%) for
negotiation between prosocial agents (PP vs PS) and lowest (59.00%)
for selfish agents.
We also observe that in every case, the selfish agents outscore
the prosocial agents which confirms their corresponding behaviors.
It is also interesting to note the scores when two agents trained
with the same reward signal but trained against different opponents
negotiate with each other.
(1) When a selfish agent trained against a selfish agent (SS)
negotiates with a selfish agent trained against a prosocial
agent (SP), the former outscores the latter by a margin of
0.06 points. This establishes the fact that SS is more selfish
than SP.
(2) When a prosocial agent trained against a prosocial agent (PP)
negotiates with a prosocial agent trained against a selfish
agent (PS), the latter outscores the former by a margin of 0.17
Table 4: Difference in scores for all agent combinations. The
selfishness of an agent decreases from left to right and top
to bottom
Player B
SS SP PS PP
Player A
SS - 0.06 0.20 0.31
SP - - 0.18 0.26
PS - - - 0.17
PP - - - -
Table 5: Performance of Meta Agent against all four kinds
of agents.
B DialogLength
Agreement
Rate (%)
Optimality
Rate (%)
Average
Score
Meta B
PP 18.68 94.41 77.15 (81.71) 0.64 0.61
SS 19.17 86.25 73.33 (85.02) 0.54 0.66
PS 13.10 92.27 76.56 (82.97) 0.69 0.55
SP 20.53 90.22 81.40 (90.22) 0.55 0.71
points. This shows that PP has learnt to be more generous
than PS.
From this, and from other interplay negotiations in Table 3 we
observe varying degrees of selfish/prosocial behavior in agents
with some agents being more selfish than others.
To verify the consistency in agent behavior, we have shown
the differences in scores (Player A - Player B) for all interplay
negotiations in the form of a matrix in Table 4. Here, each entry
is the difference in scores when corresponding agents negotiate.
We observe that the differences are in increasing order along every
row and decreasing along columns. As the agents are arranged
in decreasing order of their selfishness (from left to right and top
to bottom), this kind of distribution confirms consistency in their
behavior (i.e. if A beats B with a marginm and B beats C, then A
should be able to beat C with a margin greater thanm).
7 META AGENT - MODELING DYNAMIC
BEHAVIOR
On the surface, the selfish agent seems to be best as it always
outscores its opponents. But using such an agent leads to many
disagreements if the opponent is also selfish (see first row in Table 3).
This has also been observed in [12] apart from the fact that selfish
and prosocial behavior are not, in general, separable processes in
negotiation. It is also important to note that humans don’t really
negotiate using a fixed policy (either prosocial or selfish). They tend
to follow a mixed behavior with some degrees of both depending
on the state of the negotiation process. According to previous work
([1]), there is no universally best policy to negotiate and that it
depends on the nature of the opponent. With this motivation, we
try to model one policy that works well against all agents by using
a mixture of agents. We do this by training another RL agent to
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution of agent selection by the meta agent. Each point on the x axis represents the agent selection
sequence by the meta agent. Each number in this sequence corresponds to a particular agent.
choose which of the four agents’ policies to use given the state of
the negotiation.
7.1 Model and Training
The meta agent is an ensemble of all four agents, with a Selector
Agent on top. The job of the selector agent is to select the output
offer of one of the four agents given the context U . This agent
is modeled as a neural network similar to the one described in
Section 4.1, except that it also takes the output of all four agents as
part of its state input. The selector agent outputs a policy πs from
which an action is sampled. This action is the offer produced by
one of the four agents. The selector agent maximizes the following
objective:
Ls = E
st∼πs
[∑
t
γ (T−t )((rs (s1...T ) + ro ) − bs )
]
+ λH [πs ], (10)
where rs (s1...T ) is the reward that meta agent gets at the end of the
negotiation which is a function of the sequence of actions st it takes
and ro is the reward of the opponent. Note that we are giving the
joint reward to the meta agent which is a simple way of ensuring
that it is not biased towards one particular agent while selecting.
For training, we randomly select one of the four agents as the
opponent and make it play a batch of 100 negotiation episodes with
the meta agent. During this process, we freeze the weights of the
opponent. Similar to Section 4.1, we run 105 episodes for 5 epochs.
7.2 Analysis
We make the meta agent negotiate against each of the four agents
one by one on the test set and the results are reported in Table 5. In
terms of the scores, the meta agent is able to outscore the prosocial
agents but not the selfish ones. The meta agent does well to coordi-
nate with all agents with is reflected by the optimality. Also, the
joint reward for all the cases is greater than 1.20. In spite of that, it
is not able to match on results reported in Table 2.
Selector learns a decision tree: To analyse what the selector agent
actually learns to do, we look at the frequency distribution of the
agent selection sequence that it follows against all four agents. This
PS
4SP
6PS
PP
PP
PP
PS PP
PS
PS
PS SP
PP
PS
Figure 5: Decision tree learnt by selector agent. The numbers
4 and 6 at the second and third node denote a repetition of
SP and PS 4 and 6 times respectively.
is shown in Figure 4. The interesting part of all the four distributions
is the x axis which is the sequence of agent selection. It is same
for all four cases. Moreover, every sequence is a subsequence of
some larger sequence. This suggests that the selector agent learns
to follow a decision tree as shown in Figure 5. Here, every node
is the agent selected by the selector at a given state and the edge
represents the transition from one state to the next.
The fact that the selector agent learns a decision tree suggests
the following:
(1) The agent learns just one policy (the simplest) which works
against all agents.
(2) We know that it is difficult for an agent to decipher the
behavior of the opponent until after a few moves, hence it
makes sense to learn just one policy which works well at
any stage.
The selector agent starts off with being selfish (SP) and then
becomes more generous (PS and PP). This seems like a reasonable
policy where an agent tries to maximize its score initially by making
selfish offers but starts giving prosocial offers towards the end so
as to reach a deal.
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Table 6: Results of Human Evaluation.
Agent DialogLength
Agreement
Rate (%)
Optimality
Rate (%)
Agent
Score
Human
Score
Agent
Won (%)
Human
Won (%) Tied (%)
PP 15.07 87.38 70.87 0.58 0.62 36.67 51.11 12.22
SS 19.56 73.79 60.20 0.58 0.44 60.53 21.05 18.42
PS 13.57 92.93 66.67 0.57 0.57 40.22 52.17 7.61
SP 21.75 72.28 59.41 0.61 0.39 68.49 20.55 10.96
META 16.78 88.30 56.40 0.57 0.56 46.99 44.58 8.43
Moreover, observe that the selector agent never selects SS as
that is the most selfish agent and the chances of reaching a deal
with this agent are less (especially against a selfish opponent).
8 HUMAN EVALUATION
We have established the fact that negotiation agents have learnt
to negotiate against each other. But for real life deployment, it is
really important to test their performance when negotiating against
human players. For this purpose, we organized an experiment in
our lab where our colleagues played several rounds of negotiation
games with all the five negotiation agents (PP, SS, SP, PS andMETA).
A total of 38 human players negotiated for 3 rounds of negotiation
against all 5 agents. This means that each agent played a total of 114
negotiation games against humans. Humans were told that their
aim was to maximize their scores. We ensured this by providing
them an incentive for every game they outscore the agent (reward).
Table 6 shows the result of the human evaluation.
It is clear from the results that both the selfish agents (SS and
SP) outscore humans most of the time. The prosocial agents (PP
and PS) on the other hand, get outscored on more occasions. This
shows that the behavior of human players is between prosocial and
selfish i.e. they have a hybrid behavior which we had hypothesized
in Section 7 and that had motivated us build a meta agent. With the
meta agent, humans win an almost equal number of times as the
meta agent. This proves that we have been somewhat successful in
emulating human behavior through our meta agent.
The optimality is not on the higher side. This, we argue, is be-
cause humans had no incentive to reach an optimal solution which
is the case most of the time in real life. We have argued in Section 5
that coordination is necessary to reach optimal solutions, which
in turn is attained if the negotiating parties develop their policies
according to their opponent. This opens up an option for future
work where AI agents actually undergo learning in real time by
playing many negotiating games against humans. The issue, of
course, is the scale of the training instances, which needs to be
solved.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have introduced a simple way of using Deep Reinforcement
Learning to train agents for contract negotiation. As this is a mul-
tiagent setting, we have been successful in modeling varying be-
haviors in agents by varying the reward signal in the player and its
opponent. Empirical evidence shows coordination in agents so as
to reach optimal solutions. We have also built a Meta Agent that
shows a dynamic behavior by learning an ensemble of models. That
our agents can be deployed in real world scenarios is evidenced
by the consistency in their trained behaviors against real human
players. The fact that we use reinforcement learning to build agents
with multiple negotiating behaviors and provide evidence for their
usability with human evaluation makes this work a unique contri-
bution. There is much scope for improvement in terms of behavior
modeling wherein we may use Reinforcement Learning to learn
hyperparameters involved in the proposal curves as used in Ref. [4]
and also in the reward signals in Ref. [21]. We need to look into
ways to train agents to ground their communication in natural lan-
guage (NL) while negotiating by making them perform a parallel
NL task as done in Ref. [15].
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A EXAMPLE NEGOTIATION
An example where agents learn to coordinate and complement their
moves is shown in Table 7. This is the actual transcript where we
show two different pairs of agents reaching an agreement on the
same set of utilities. The top part is when both agents are PP and
the bottom part is when one agent to be SP and the other is PS. Here
clause 4 is bad for both agents, but when both agents are Prosocial,
it finds its way into the final cut. But this doesn’t happen when
both agents have different behaviors.
B HYPERPARAMETER SETTINGS
The OfferMLP() is a 2-layer MLP with 64 hidden units in each layer
and ReLU activation. Both AgentLookup() and TurnLookup() are
embeddings with size 32. The GRU() has a hidden state size of
256. The baseline bi and bs is computed as the running average of
the rewards received for each agent i . The entropy regularization
weight parameter λ is changed in every epoch. For 5 epochs, the
values of λ are [0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001]. The discount factor γ
is set to 0.99.
For training, we used SGD optimizer with nesterov [20] and
momentum of 0.1. The learning rate was fixed to 0.01.
Table 7: ExampleNegotiation. Top part is the casewhen both
agents are PP. Bottom part shows negotiation on same utili-
ties but when A is SP and B is PS.
Agent C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Utilities A -6 12 -1 -1 -3 -1
B -2 -6 -1 -1 -2 12
Offers
APP 0 1 0 0 0 1
BPP 0 0 0 1 0 1
APP 0 1 0 1 0 0
BPP 0 0 0 1 0 1
APP 0 1 0 1 0 0
BPP 0 0 0 1 0 1
APP 0 1 0 1 0 1
BPP 0 1 0 1 0 1
Result Non optimal solution
Offers
ASP 0 1 0 1 0 1
BPS 1 0 1 0 1 1
ASP 0 1 1 0 0 1
BPS 1 0 0 1 1 1
ASP 0 1 0 1 0 1
BPS 1 0 1 0 1 1
ASP 0 1 1 0 0 1
BPS 0 0 0 1 0 1
ASP 0 1 0 0 0 0
BPS 0 1 0 0 0 1
ASP 0 1 0 0 0 1
Result Optimal solution
